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ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
1. A PRIORI ESTIMATES
The observed effects of education and the wage rate on the demand for
health reported in Chapter V are precisely the ones predicted by the
investment model. The coefficients of these two variables have the "wrong
signs," however, in the demand curve for medical care. Appendix D
showed that biases introduced by (1) measurement error in the wage rate
and (2) a positive association between the wage and innate ability operate
in opposite directions on a given health regression coefficient but in the
same direction on the corresponding medical care coefficient. Since the
two sources of bias tend to offset each other in the health demand curve, it
is not surprising that the estimates of its parameters are more consistent
with a priori notions. Moreover, the correlation between the wage rate
and education exceeds the correlation between the former and any of the
other independent variables except income. So the negative relation
between the wage rate and the medical care function's error term seriously
affects not only the estimate of the wage elasticity but also the estimate of
the education parameter.1
Assuming that the biases exactly offset each other in the health
demand function, one can use its education or wage coefficient to solve
for the corresponding medical care coefficient. He can then force the
education coefficient, for example, to assume its proper value and examine
the effect of this procedure on the estimates of the other coefficients of the
medical care demand curve. In the stock of health demand curve in
Table 1, the education coefficient is=.025.Since=.5,r11.05.
Therefore, education's medical care parameter should be rH(c —I)=
— .025.Consequently, if In M + .025E were the dependent variable in the
medical care demand function and if E were excluded from the regression,
its coefficient would be forced to equal the appropriate value.
Thedifficult questionof the effect of the biases on the income elasticity of medical
care wasnottreated in Appendix D.Thisappendix comments on the change in the income
elasticity induced byimprovedestimates of the wageandeducationparameters.Appendix E 103
Along similar lines, the stock elasticity of the wage rate is (1 —K)c=
.090,which suggests K =.82.2The wage elasticity of medical care is given
by (1 —K)c+ Ka1,, where a,, is the elasticity of substitution between
medical care and own time in the production of gross investment. The
Cobb-Douglas specification implies=1,so the wage elasticity of
medical care should equal .910. By defining the dependent variable as
In M —.910In W and excluding in W from the regression, such a value
would actually be obtained. The structure and reduced form of the model
would be practically unaffected if medical care and own time were em-
ployed in fixed proportions. Therefore, a,, might also be set equal to zero
to get a lower bound on the wage elasticity. In this case, the elasticity
would be .090,and the dependent variable in the medical care demand
curve would be In M —.090In W.
Table E-1 gives demand curves for medical care that take account of
the a priori restrictions on the coefficients of E and In W. In the first
regression in Part A of the table, the coefficient of E is set equal to —.025.In
the second, the wage elasticity equals .9 10, while in the third, it equals .090.
•The fourth regression defines the dependent variable as in M + .025E —
.910In W so that both restrictions are imposed simultaneously. Finally,
the fifth regression uses In M + .025E —.090In W as the dependent
variable.
• The regressions in Part B of the table are based on the coefficients of E
and ln W in the health flow demand curve.3 This function suggests that
education's medical care parameter should be —.046.It also suggests a
wage elasticity of .676 if a,, =1and an elasticity of .324 if a,, =0.
The table shows that when the education coefficient alone is res-
tricted, the wage elasticity increases in absolute value. In Table 3, this
elasticity equals —.105,in Part A of Table E-1 it equals —.009,and in Part
B, it equals .046. Although the wage elasticity is still negative in Part A
and is never statistically significant, the magnitude of its increase is
substantial.
Restricted wage elasticities that are based on an elasticity of substitu-
tion equal to unity make the education coefficient negative but not
statistically significant. These wage elasticities generate income elasticities
equal to .080 (Part A) and .221 (Part B). Such elasticities are smaller than
2In this section, all wage elasticities of health are taken from regressions that use Y4
asthe income variable. These elasticities give conservative lower estimates of the true
parameters.
'In particular,averagesof the wage and education coefficientsinthe work-loss days
andrestricted-activity days regressions are used.104 Appendix E
TABLE E-1
A Priori Estimates of Demand for Medical Care by Whites with Positive
Sick Time
Assumed












































































































Coefficient forced to assume the value shown.
all existing estimates, and few students of the demand for medical care
would accept their validity.4 More reasonable income elasticities result
when a,, is set equal to zero, particularly when the education coefficient is
Previous studies indicate that the income elasticity of medical care is slightly less
than unity. If the wage elasticity is positive, then these estimates are biased upward. In a
recent study, Morris Silver computed an income elasticity that did hold the wage rate
constant. He obtained an income elasticity of 1.20 and a wage elasticity of 2.07. (See "An
Economic Analysis of Variations in Medical Expenses and Work-Loss Rates," in Herbert
E. Kiarman (ed.), Empirical Studies in Health Economics, Baltimore, 1970, and reprinted as
Chapter 6 in Victor R. Fuchs (ed), Essays in the Economics of Health and Medical Care,
New York, NBER, 1972. In my judgment, Silver's elasticities are unreasonably high.Appendix E 105
also constrained to be negative. If the wage coefficient alone is restricted
and is assumed to equal .090, the education coefficient falls from .012
(Table 3) to .002 (Table E-1, Part A). While education still has a positive
effect on medical care in the a priori demand curve, the size of this effect is
much smaller.
The conclusions to be drawn from a priori estimation are, at best,
tentative because the technique assumes that the health coefficients are
unbiased. But the results do indicate that an a priori computation of the
education parameter improves the actual estimate of the wage elasticity.
Conversely, an a priori, computation of the wage elasticity improves the
actual estimate of the education parameter. The reduction in the calculated
education effect and the increase in the wage effect suggest that biases
introduced by errors of measurement may play an important role in the
demand curve for medical care. The results also indicate that the elasticity
of substitution between medical care and own time is small. This means
that even if the wage elasticity is positive, it cannot be very large.
2. DEMAND CURVES: ALL WHITES IN THE LABOR FORCE,
MALES, AND FEMALES
Tables E-2, E-3, and E-4 present a complete set of demand curves for all
whites in the labor force. Tables E-5, E-6, and E-7 present a complete set of
these functions for males with positive sick time; and Tables E-8, E-9, and
E-10 give demand curves for females with positive sick time. The reader
is left to inspect these tables for himself.
TABLE E-2
Stock Demand for Health by All Whites in the Labor Force
Encome






























































NoTE: The health stock series is 1 =poor,2 =fair,3 =good,6 =excellent.106 Appendix E
TABLE E-3
Flow Demand for Health by All Whites in the Labor Force
Income
Measure In Y4 In W E i Sex In FS
TL =WLD1
11 .048 .207 .066 —.009 .114 .180 .008
(.26) (1.25) (2.52) (—1.23) (.57) (1.02)
Y2 —.128 .295 .066 —.009 .163 .220 .008
(—.66) (1.80) (2.66) (—1.17)
Y4 —.092 .277 .066 —.009
(.80) (1.23)
.150 .216 .008
(—.52) (1.75) (2.65) (—1.18) (.75) (1.20)
Y4 .079 .079 —.009 — .031 .163 .007
(.55) (3.11) (—1.07) (—.17) (.92)
Y omitted .229 .066 —.009 .123 .185 .009
(1.76) (2.60) (—1.22) (.63) (1.09)
TL=RAD
Yl —.132 .066 .054 —.006 — .222 .282.004
(—.67) (.38) (2.02) (—.92)(—1.09) (1.56)
Y2 —.300 .150 .054 —.006 —.156 .336.005
(—1.45) (.86) (2.09) (—.88) (—.72) (1.80)
Y4 —.294 .144 .060 —.006 —.156 .348 .005
(—1.56) (.85) (2.15) (—.87) (—.75) (1.87)
Y4 —.204 .060 —.006 — .252 .324.005
(—1.31) (2.40) (—.82)(—1.38) (1.75)
Y omitted —.006 .048 —.006 — .252 .264.004
(—.02) (1.93) (—.97)(—1.23) (1.46)
TABLE E-4
Demand for Medical Care by All Whitesinthe Labor Force
Income
Measure In Y In W E Sex In FS
Yl .450 .036 .026 .012 .585 —.197.039
(3.79) (.35) (1.60) (3.04) (4.72) (—1.80)
Y2 .548 —.008 .027 .012 .495 —.257.042
(4.44) (—.07) (1.74) (3.04) (3.86) (—2.30)
Y4 .521 .014 .025 .012 .507 —.280.043
(4.66) (.14) (1.53) (3.03) (4.01) (—2.48)
Y4 .530 .025 .012 .499 —.282.043
(5.71) (1.60) (3.04) .(4.59) (—2.54)
Y omitted .272 .036 .013 .670 —.122.032
(3.28) (2.25) (3.30) (5.47) (—1.13)Appendix E 107
TABLE E-5
Stock Demand for Health by Males with Positive Sick Time
Income
Measure In Y In W E I In FS
Yl .040 .106 .028 —.010 .018 .193
(.63) (1.69) (4.01) (—5.89) (.41)
Y2 .041 .109 .028 —.010 .018 .193
(.70) (1.95) (4.03) (—5.90) (.40)
Y4 .041 .111 .028 —.010 .017 .193
(.76) (2.13) (4.01) (—5.89) (.38)
Y4 .118 .033 —.009 .010 .186
(2.90) (5.1'3) (—5.73) (.22)
Yomitted .138 .028 —.010 .019 .194
(3.53) (3.98) (—5.g7) (.43)
NOTE: The health stock series isI =poor,1.6 =fair,2.9 =good,4.9 =excellent.
TABLE E-6
Flow Demand for Health by Males with Positive Sick Time
Income
Measure in Y In W E I In FS R2
TL=WLDI
Y1 —.324 .660 .050 —.012 .318 .125
(—1.88) (3.87) (2.65) (—2.62) (2.68)
Y2 —.289 .606 .048 —.012 .319 .125
(—1.80) (3.99) (2.57) (—2.61) (2.69)
Y4 —.040 .434 .052 —.012 .314 .118
(—.27) (3.06) (2.77) (—2.69) (2.63)
Y4 .260 .073 —.011 .287 .099
(2.34) (4.14) (—2.45) (2.39)
Yomitted .409 .052 —.012 .312 .120
(3.87) (2.79) (—2.71) (2.62)
TL=RAD
Y1 —.340 .515 .045 —.014 .257 .088
(—1.91) (2.92) (2.31) (—3.01) (2.10)
Y2 —.292 .450 .044 —.014 .258 .087
(—1.76) (2.87) (2.24) (—3.01) (2.10)
Y4 —.138 .339 .047 —.014 .257 .082
(—.91) (2.32) (2.40) (—3.06) (2.09)
Y4 .096 .063 —.013 .236 .072
(.84) (3.48) (—2.89) (1.91)
V omitted .251 .048 —.014 .251 .082
(2.30) (2.46) (—3.19) (2.04)108 Appendix E
TABLE E-7
Demand for Medical Care by Males with Positive Sick Time
Income
Measure my mW E I InFS
Yl .857 — .477 .028 .025 — .294 .071






















































































NcxrE: The health stock series is 1 =poor,1.8 =fair,1.6 =good,5.1 =excellent.
The variable wasdeletedby the regression program since its F ratio was less than
.005.Appendix E 109
TABLE E-9
Flow Demand for Health by Females with Positive Sick Time
Income
Measure In Y In W E I In FS
TL =WLDL
Y1 —.193 .228 .039 .008 .080 —.011
(—.77) (.90) (1.24) (1.04) (.38)
Y2 .097 .053 .035 .007 — .049 —.014
(.36) (.20) (1.12) (.82) (—.20)
Y4 .184 —.004 .034 .006 —.115 —.010
(.78) (—.02) (1.11) (.74) (—.47)
Y4 .182 .034 .006 —.114—.004
(.96) (1.15) (.74) (— .51)




Yl —.223 .082 .050 .006 .144 —.015
(—.85) (.30) (1.52) (.70) (.66)
Y2 —.091 .005 .046 .005 .117 —.019
(—.32) (.02) (1.42) (.58) (.45)
Y4 —.099 .011 .046 .005 .129 —.019
(— .40) (.04) (1.42) (.60) (.50)
Y4 —.093 .047 .005 .124 —.012
(— .46) (1.48) (.60) (.53)
Y omitted —.052 046 .004 .062 —.013
(—.24) (1.41) (.54) (.32)
The variable was deleted by the regression program since its Fratio was less than
.005.
TABLE E-1O
Demand for Medical Care by Females with PositiveSick Time
Income
Measure in Y in W E I In FS
Y1 .518 .354 —.019 —.002 .077 .027
(1.51) (1.03) (—.45) (—.18) (.27)
Y2 .409 .405 —.012 — .001 .019 .020
(1.13) (1.12) (—.27) (—.06) (.06)
y4 .349 .437 —.011 —.001 .028 .019
(1.08) (1.26) (—.26) (—.07) (.08)
Y4 .590 .003 — .001 — .144 .015
(2.27) (.08) (—.06) (—.47)
Yomitted .661 —.009 .001 .265 .018
(2.36) (—.22) (.13) (1.04)